History of Kashmir

Early History-1949

Background

• Kashmir had secured the right to self-govern by paying a tribute to the British in the past.
• When the British left, 550 Princely States including Kashmir had to make a decision. Kashmir could become independent or join either India or Pakistan.
• Due to the contiguous geography and demography of Kashmir, Jinnah was convinced that Kashmir will join Pakistan. Unfortunately, it was a naive misjudgment of huge proportions.

The Maharaja

• Maharaja Hari Singh, the autocratic ruler of Kashmir, was an aristocrat whose main interests were food, hunting, sex and horse racing. He showed a lack of judgement in matters of state.
• He was a Hindu but he ruled over a multi-ethnic state where Muslims were in majority.
• The area of his rule included:
  1. Jammu (Hindu majority)
  2. Ladakh (Buddhist majority)
  3. Gilgit-Baltistan (Muslim majority)
  4. Kashmir Valley (Muslim majority)
• In 1941, it was reported that the Muslims were in a bad condition: they were poor, illiterate and had little contact with the aristocrats. The maharaja himself hardly ever met his Muslim subjects.
• • As the British prepared to leave, it was clear the maharaja wanted independence.

The British

• The maharaja faced the opposition of Jinnah, Nehru and the British. Lord Louis Mountbatten made special efforts to make sure Kashmir did not opt for autonomy: he set aside six days for a visit to the maharaja’s summer capital, Srinagar.
• Pakistani historians believe that Mountbatten convinced the maharaja to join Delhi. Indian counterparts believe that the viceroy behaved appropriately and only gave advice to the maharaja. Nonetheless, the actual discussions that took place in Srinagar will never be known.
• There are also controversies that Lord Mountbatten had influenced Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the person who was charged with drawing the border of India and Pakistan. Sir Cyril Radcliffe had never set foot in India so his commission (Boundary Commission) was to be completely impartial. There are documents of Sir Cyril Radcliffe that initially gave Ferozepor to Pakistan but was later changed after a meeting with Lord Mountbatten. Even Indian historians have accepted this fact. Nevertheless, there was no conclusive evidence for Mountbatten’s advocacy for Kashmir to be a part of India.
• Lord Mountbatten did advocate a referendum or a plebiscite in Kashmir. He stated that even if the maharaja acceded to India, it would only be temporary. The real decision of Kashmir would be taken by its people.

India’s Strategy

• The Muslim League leadership had their hands full due to the creation of a new state. There were barely any visits to Kashmir by the Pakistani leadership.
• On the other hand, the Indian counterparts established their interest in Kashmir. Nehru had toured Kashmir in 1945 and had addressed a National Conference rally. He visited again in 1946.
• The Congress lobbying effort in Kashmir meant that if there was to be an accession, the maharaja would opt for India and not Pakistan.

The Poonch Uprising

• Once the British left, the state of Kashmir started disintegrating. There was communal violence, many Muslims fled to Pakistan and many Hindus fled to India.
• The situation was very dire in Poonch were the most troublesome Muslim subjects existed. They were ordered by the maharaja to give away their weapons which sparked an uprising in September 1947.
• Jinnah hoped that the uprising might force the maharaja to opt for Pakistan. Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan drew up plans to help the rebels and to not directly intervene in Kashmir: a policy Pakistan has continued for a long time.
• The effort to support the rebels was small-scale but the maharaja was offended that Pakistan was backing the rebels. He didn’t even meet envoys from Karachi during the rebellion.
• In October, tribesmen from NWFP started entering Kashmir to relieve it from the maharaja. This was, again, supported by the Pakistani government. Some say that Jinnah did not know about this, the constitutionally-minded, upright and law-abiding Jinnah could have very well not known about this.
• At first, the tribesmen enjoyed success against the maharaja’s forces but then they got distracted and started pillaging the villages. These developments gave bad press to Pakistan.
• The maharaja signed the accession to India to stop these uprisings and rebellions and Indian troops were deployed. However, it is not clear whether the troops were deployed first or the accession was signed first.

Jinnah’s Failure

• Jinnah was a brilliant man with a combination of talents when it came to constitution and law. However, there was a multitude of reasons why Kashmir became his failure. Some are given below:
  • Jinnah was sick.
  • His administration skills were not as effective as his law-making.
  • He had a plethora of problems such as the refugee crisis.
  • The armed forces of Pakistan largely had British soldiers which did not want to fight the Indian troops (also British).
• Jinnah also failed to compromise over another Princely State, Hyderabad. He was an idealist and hoped that Hyderabad would remain independent by making a political decision. However, Delhi deployed troops and took over Hyderabad.
• Junagadh was a completely opposite mirror of Kashmir. However, the Indian forces blockaded Junagadh, invaded it and held a flimsy plebiscite: Junagadh became part of India.
• Even the US State Department had hoped that a compromise on Kashmir would be reached, “the obvious solution is for the government leaders in Pakistan and India to agree…[to the] accession of Kashmir to Pakistan and the accession of Hyderabad and Junagadh to India.” British officials in London concurred. Jinnah, however, never did the deal and the fighting continued.
• By the end of the year, Delhi controlled about two-thirds of Kashmir and Karachi about one-third. On 1 January 1949, a ceasefire came into effect in Kashmir.

1949-1965

• After the ceasefire, Liaqat Ali Khan decided that two areas under Pakistan control, Gilgit and Baltistan, should not be incorporated in case there ever was a referendum. The vote of the Muslim population in these areas will come in handy. This policy remains the same even today.
• India pursued a more proactive policy. Sheikh Abdullah was made the Prime Minister of Kashmir (an old ally of Delhi) and the maharaja (who wanted self rule) was exiled. However, Abdullah pursued the same policy even though he stated his commitment to a secular India.
• UN also became involved and their proposal was to have a referendum in Kashmir. However, the UN failed to implement this as neither India nor Pakistan were willing to pull out of their acquired territories. The Kashmir dispute was one of the first to expose the weakness of UN: it could suggest a resolution but it could not impose it.
• China also got involved when it laid claim to the area known as Aksai Chin. Pakistan stated that if Kashmir joined Pakistan, it would not contest China’s claims. However, India complained bitterly regarding the involvement of China and Pakistan in this matter.
• This was also the period of the Cold War. Pakistan sided with US for support and India sided with USSR. USSER liberally used its veto power on the UNSC in Delhi’s favour.
• In 1952, the Congress leadership had decided that Abdullah was too volatile and was creating a Muslim one-party state. He was to remain in detention for the next 15 years. He was replaced by Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad who advocated for Kashmir to be a part of India.
• India had hoped that the issue of Kashmir would settle down with time but in December 1965, a religious relic of the Muslims had been stolen which produced an intense outburst of Muslim feeling and provoked social unrest. Pakistan wondered whether it could use this to its advantage.

1965 War

• The 1965 war between India and Pakistan was particularly futile; not much was achieved by either side.
• The causes of the war were:
  1. Sense of insecurity on both sides.
  2. Pakistan’s improving relationship with China and Soviet Union (with the help of Bhutto as Foreign Minister).
  3. Bhutto’s opinion that the people of Kashmir wanted a revolution due to the uprising and Abdullah’s recent comments on India.
  4. Ayub’s confidence in his military machine after supplies from US and victory in Rann of Kutch. It was a fact that Pakistani army was well trained and well equipped as compared to their Indian counterparts.
• By late 1964, operation GIBRALTAR and operation GRANDSLAM was conceived by Ayub and Bhutto.
• In operation GIBRALTAR, a body called the Revolutionary Council called on the people to rise up against their Indian occupiers. However, the Kashmir people were reluctant and even suspicious of this council. The militants that were sent by Pakistan to rouse up revolution failed. From Pakistan’s point of view, operation GIBRALTAR had been disappointing.
• For India, however, the situation was alarming. India decided that it could not show weakness. It launched a major offensive, crossed the ceasefire line and prevented further infiltration.
• Two days later, because of the eagerness of Bhutto and the orders of Ayub, operation GRANDSLAM was launched. Pakistani army was deployed in western Kashmir. Initially they enjoyed success but later on, India attacked from all fronts (Lahore, Sialkot, areas of Sindh). Pakistan was taken by surprise but did manage to halt the Indian advances on Lahore and Sialkot.
• Ayub Khan realized he needed the help of China, and China complied but did not help militarily as it concluded a war with India would be devastating for the whole region. China helped Pakistan and India de-escalate. However, this meant that Ayub had to agree a ceasefire.
• The situation stabilized and both the countries were pressurized by the international community to talk. In January 1966, they did so in Tashkent and the two sides agreed to go back to their pre-war positions.
• In 1949, Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire, it controlled one-third of Kashmir and had convinced Nehru to a referendum. After the 1965 war, India’s commitment to a referendum did not look as strong as before. India tightened its grip. It established cordial relations with Abdullah who was made the chief minister of Kashmir in return for special status.
• For the Pakistani public, the result was shocking. They were given the impression that they were winning the war but it effectively ended up in a draw. Ayub lost his popularity but Bhutto didn’t as he distanced himself from the war and its aftermath. Pakistani public saw the accord between the Indian government and Abdullah as a sell-out.

1971 War Aftermath

• Despite how Bhutto instigated the 1965 war, he remained popular.
• In 1971, Pakistan’s Eastern wing broke away with India’s interference and it was upto Bhutto to re-establish a modus vivendi with India.
• Bhutto met Indira Gandhi at Simla. The main outcomes of the Simla Conference were:
  1. Ceasefire Line changed to Line of Control. This signified a permanence for years to come.
  2. The two sides would ‘settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed between them.’
• Ever since, India has relied on the Simla Conference to deny any third-party interference in their issues. This is why international mediation is hard in Kashmir.

The Insurgency

• Indian and Pakistani forces clashed again on the glacier of Siachen in 1984. However, the severity of the climate means that demarcation of boundaries is not possible and more people die from the cold than through military actions.
• During the 1980s anti-Indian opinion steadily hardened due to the emergence of different parties:
  1. Jamaat-e-Islami (advocated for Pakistan)
  2. Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (advocated for independence)
  3. Hizb ul-Mujahideen (active in 1990s)
  4. Lashkar-i-Taiba
  5. Jaish-i-Muhammad
• The insurgency has continued ever since and, according to the Pakistani government, has cost over 60,000 lives. India claims the figure is closer to 30,000.
• India has blamed Pakistan for the insurgency, while Pakistan has denied it. It is true that Pakistan looked the other way when militant attacks occurred but there has never been conclusive evidence that Pakistan actively backed the militants.
• The militants’ struggle has provoked a terrible response. India’s atrocious human rights record in Kashmir is an established fact: Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and India’s own National Human Rights Commission have produced copious reports documenting the repressive conduct of the Indian security forces.
• Throughout the 1990s this brutal display of state power failed to break the insurgency and the insurgency failed to gain independence or join Pakistan.
• The single most important event in this process was the exodus of a large proportion of the Hindu population from the Kashmir Valley in 1990. The Hindus came from the minority Pundit community.
• The anti-Indian political leadership tried to present a united front in the shape of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). It included parties like Jamaat-i-Islami and Muslim Conference.
• Although the militants still enjoyed a wide platform of support, a significant number of Kashmiris began to have their doubts. Far from seeing the fighters as liberators, some perceived them as a disruptive element waging a communal, internecine and possibly futile struggle.
• Musharraf banned Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jaish-i-Muhammed 13 years after the insurgency. For all the loss of life it had achieved remarkably little.
• To achieve something tangible, a formidable force joined the battle: the Pakistan army.

Kargil

• Even to this day, Kargil is a taboo subject in Pakistan. The refusal to acknowledge what happened at Kargil has permeated the Pakistan military itself.
• In the spring of 1999, Pakistani troops occupied over 40 square miles of Indian-held territory without firing a single shot. The operation relied on stealth.
• India’s tactics for controlling the territory around Kargil were largely determined by the area’s hostile climate. When it was too cold, they evacuated the outposts. The Pakistani army took advantage of this fact.
• India deployed troops and air force to take back the outposts; they were largely successful.
• Kargil resulted in a clash between the civilian government and the military in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif, the PM, claimed that he was not notified of the Kargil operation. It was a bad image internationally as it suggested that Pakistan had a rogue army. Pakistan army denied any rogueness and stated that Nawaz Sharif knew about Kargil.
• For all its efforts to concentrate world opinion on India’s human rights abuses in Kashmir, Pakistan had instead managed to enhance its image as an aggressive and unpredictable state.
• It is often said that the Kashmir dispute will not be solved because significant power centres in India and Pakistan have an interest in sustaining the conflict. There is some truth in this argument.
  • The armed forces in both countries use the Kashmir issue to justify their huge shares of public expenditure.
  • The conflict also provides a rallying cry for extremists and politicians.
• For many in the international community, the Kargil dispute added weight to the view that the line of control should become an international border.
• Unfortunately, ever since 1947 the views of the Kashmiris have been obscured by the dispute between India and Pakistan.